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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-FREEDOM OF EXPRES-
SION-PUBLIC INDECENCY-The United States Supreme Court held
that the enforcement of Indiana's public indecency statute to re-
quire dancers to wear G-strings and pasties at adult entertainment
establishments did not violate the First Amendment.
Barnes v Glen Theatre, Inc., US , 111 S Ct 2456 (1991).
In 1985, Glen Theatre, Inc. (hereinafter "Glen Theatre"), an
adult entertainment establishment wishing to feature nude danc-
ing,' and two scheduled performers2 brought suit in federal court
to enjoin the state of Indiana from enforcing the Indiana public
indecency statute.' The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana granted the motion for the prelimi-
nary injunction,4 holding that the statute was overly broad on its
1. Barnes v Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S Ct 2456, 2459 (1991). Glen Theatre, Inc. was
an Indiana corporation with a place of business in South Bend known as the Chippewa
Bookstore, which provided adult entertainment including live nude and semi-nude perform-
ances by female dancers. Glen Theatre, Inc. v Civil City of South Bend, 726 F Supp 728,
729 (N D Ind 1985). Customers would sit in private booths and insert coins in a timing
mechanism permitting them to observe the performances through glass panels. Glen Thea-
tre, 726 F Supp at 729. Only fee-paying, consenting adults over the age of eighteen could
view the performances, and no accidental viewing by a nonconsenting person was possible.
Id.
2. Barnes, 111 S Ct at 2459. The two performers were Gayle Ann Marie Sutro and
Carla Johnson. Id. Ms. Sutro had been a dancer, model, and actress for more than fifteen
years and was to perform at the Chippewa Bookstore in conjunction with her appearance in
a pornographic movie also being shown in South Bend. Id.
3. Id at 2458. Ind Code § 35-45-4-1 provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
(1) Engages in sexual intercourse;
(2) Engages in deviate sexual intercourse;
(3) Appears in a state of nudity; or,
(4) Fondles the genitals of himself or another person, commits public indecency, a
class A misdemeanor.
(b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or
buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with
less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of the
covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
Ind Code § 35-45-4-1 (1977).
From 1983 to 1985, approximately eleven individuals were arrested at the Chippewa
Bookstore for violating this statute. Glen Theatre, 726 F Supp at 729.
4. Black's Law Dictionary defines "preliminary injunction" as "an injunction granted
at the institution of a suit, to restrain the defendant from doing or continuing some act, the
right to which is in dispute, and which may either be discharged or made perpetual, accord-
ing to the result of the controversy, as soon as the rights of the parties are determined."
Black's Law Dictionary 705 (West, 5th ed 1979).
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face.5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
versed the district court's finding that the statute was unconstitu-
tional on its face. The court of appeals based its decision on the
United States Supreme Court's summary dismissal of the appeals
from three Indiana Supreme Court decisions which found that the
public indecency statute was not overly broad and therefore was
constitutional on its face.7 The case was remanded to the district
court to determine if the statute was constitutional as applied.s
On remand, the district court consolidated the Glen Theatre
case with two other cases,9 and held that the type of nude dancing
in question was not expressive activity protected by the First
Amendment,'0 but was mere conduct that was within the police
5. Glen Theatre, 726 F Supp at 732. In their complaint, the plaintiffs sought both
injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that the public indecency statute was unconsti-
tutional on its face or in the alternative, that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to
the performances at the Chippewa Bookstore. Id at 729.
The district court, through Chief Judge Allen Sharp, found that because the statute pro-
hibited all nude appearances in public places at any time, in any manner, and for any pur-
pose, the statute was overly broad in that it could have a substantial detrimental effect on
legitimate expression protected by the First Amendment. Id at 732. The court noted a num-
ber of decisions, including State v Baysinger, 272 Ind 236, 397 NE2d 580 (1980), and Schad
v Borough of Mt. Ephriam, 452 US 61 (1981), which indicated that non-obscene nude danc-
ing may be entitled to some form of First Amendment protection. Glen Theatre, 726 F
Supp at 729.
For a discussion of Baysinger and Schad, see notes 89-109 and accompanying text.
6. Glen Theatre, Inc. v Pearson, 802 F2d 287 (7th Cir 1986).
7. Glen Theatre, 802 F2d at 288. The court of appeals noted that the overbreadth
challenge to the constitutionality of § 35-45-4-1 was rejected by the Indiana Supreme Court
in Baysinger. Id. See note 5. Thus the court concluded that the United States Supreme
Court's summary dismissal of the appeal in Baysinger, along with the appeals in two other
cases that raised the identical issue of the overbreadth of § 35-45-4-1, Clark v Indiana and
Lake County Prosecutor, 446 US 931 (1980), and Dove v State, 449 US 806 (1980),
amounted to a ruling that the statute was constitutional on its face. Glen Theatre, 802 F2d
at 289.
8. Glen Theatre, 802 F2d at 290.
9. Glen Theatre, Inc. v Civil City of South Bend, 695 F Supp 414 (N D Ind 1988).
The two cases consolidated with Glen Theatre were Miller v Civil City of South Bend, No S
85-598, and Diamond v Civil City of South Bend, No S 85-722.
The Miller case involved an establishment known as JR's Kitty Kat Lounge, Inc., which
wished to provide nude entertainment in light of the injunction issued in the original Glen
Theatre case. Glen Theatre, 695 F Supp at 420. The owner of the Kitty Kat Lounge, Inc.
and Darlene Miller, a dancer, brought suit for an injunction. Id.
Similarly, in the Diamond case, Sandy Diamond, Lynn Jacobs and two corporations
(Ramona's Car Wash and the Ace-Hi Lounge) sought injunctive relief against the same de-
fendants to enjoin them from enforcing the public indecency statute. Id at 421.
Prior to the district court's hearing on remand, the Chippewa Bookstore was destroyed by
fire, and the cause of action as to that plaintiff became moot. Id at 416.
10. Id at 418. For a discussion of the First Amendment and its applicability to the
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power of the state to prohibit or regulate."
The case was again appealed to the Seventh Circuit where a
panel of judges unanimously held that the public indecency statute
was unconstitutional as applied because the nude dancing in ques-
tion was expressive activity protected by the First Amendment.2
Upon a majority vote by the judges sitting in the Seventh Circuit,
that opinion was vacated, and a rehearing en banc" was granted.'
4
On rehearing, the majority' 5 concluded that nonobscene nude
dancing performed for entertainment is protected expressive activ-
ity and that the Indiana public indecency statute impermissibly
infringed on that protected activity.' 6
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
the issue of whether the Indiana public indecency statute as ap-
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see notes 54-58 and
accompanying text.
11. Barnes, 111 S Ct at 2459.
12. Id at 2459, 2460, citing Miller v Civil City of South Bend, 887 F2d 826 (7th Cir
1989).
13. Barnes, 111 S Ct at 2460. "En banc" refers to a session where the entire member-
ship of the court will participate in the decision rather than the regular quorum. Black's
Law Dictionary at 472 (cited in note 4).
14. Miller v Civil City of South Bend, 904 F2d 1081, 1082 (7th Cir 1990).
15. Circuit Judge Flaum wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Judge Bauer and
Circuit Judges Cummings, Wood, Jr., Cudahy, Posner, and Ripple joined. Miller, 904 F2d at
1081. In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Cudahy, while agreeing that "striptease danc-
ing" is expressive activity, questioned the need to invoke the First Amendment. Id at 1089.
He argued that the Founding Fathers did not have "striptease dancing" in mind when
drafting the Amendment. Id.
In an exhaustive separate concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Posner attempted to refute
every conceivable argument against recognizing striptease dancing as an expressive artform.
Id at 1089-1104.
Circuit Judge Coffey wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that the application of the public
indecency statute to nude dancing implemented the state's legitimate interest in public mo-
rality, Which interest was unrelated to the expression prohibited. Id at 1105.
In another dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Easterbrook, joined by Circuit Judges Ma-
nion and Kanne, and joined in part by Circuit Judge Coffey, argued that nudity is conduct,
not expression, which may be regulated by the state without violating the First Amendment.
Id at 1120.
Finally, Circuit Judge Manion also entered a dissenting opinion, joined by Circuit Judges
Coffey and Easterbrook, in which he argued that the statute was valid because the nude
dancing in question communicated no ideas. Id at 1131. Additionally he contended that
even if nude dancing was expressive, the expressive elements would be outweighed by the
State's interest in prohibiting public nudity. Id.
16. Id. The Seventh Circuit in Miller, 904 F2d 1081, in concluding that nude dancing
for entertainment is expressive activity, reasoned that the nude dancers intended to commu-
nicate a message of eroticism and sensuality, and the message was understood by those who
viewed it. Id at 1086-87. Thus the state, while retaining the right to establish reasonable
time, place and manner restrictions on the expressive activity, could not permissibly impose
a total ban on the activity. Id at 1088-89.
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plied was an impermissible infringement on an expressive activity
protected by the First Amendment. 7
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, 18 reversed.19 Justice
Rehnquist began by recognizing that nude dancing for entertain-
ment is expressive conduct within the "outer perimeters" of First
Amendment protection. 0 He noted, however, that it was still nec-
essary to determine the level of protection to be afforded to this
type of conduct.2 He likewise indicated a need to determine
whether Indiana's public indecency statute impermissibly in-
fringed upon the protected activity of nonobscene nude dancing.22
In addressing these issues, the Court cited United States v
O'Brien,2 ' which held that a sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating some forms of expressive conduct can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. 4 The
O'Brien Court had applied the following four-prong test to deter-
mine whether the governmental interest is sufficiently justified: (1)
the regulation must be within the constitutional power of the gov-
ernment; (2) the regulation must further an important or substan-
tial government interest; (3) the government interest must be un-
related to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental
restriction must be no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.
25
Applying the O'Brien test, the Court found that the public inde-
cency statute was within the constitutional power of the state,
17. Barnes, 111 S Ct at 2460.
18. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy. Justices Scalia and Souter wrote concurring opinions. The dissent was written
by Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id at 2458.
19. Id at 2463.
20. Id, citing Doran v Salem Inn, Inc., 422 US 922 (1975), and Schad. See note 5. For
a discussion of Doran and Schad, see notes 79-88, 99-110 and accompanying text.
21. Barnes, 111 S Ct at 2460.
22. Id. The respondents in this case were The Kitty Kat Lounge, Inc., and Glen The-
atre, Inc., along with dancers Gayle Ann Marie Sutro, Carla Johnson, and Darlene Miller. Id
at 2458-59. They contended that the statute was an impermissible infringement in that it
limited the performance of the dancers. Id at 2460. The state, however, argued that the
restriction on nude dancing under the statute was a valid "time, place, and manner restric-
tion under Clark v Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 US 288 (1984), and was thus
not an unconstitutional infringement. Barnes, 111 S Ct at 2460.
23. 391 US 367- (1968). O'Brien involved a man who had burned his draft card in
protest of the Vietnam War in violation of a statute prohibiting the destruction or mutila-
tion of such cards. O'Brien, 391 US at 369. O'Brien claimed that the statute was a violation
of his First Amendment rights because his act was symbolic and expressive. Id at 376. The
Supreme Court upheld his conviction. Id at 386.
24. Barnes, 111 S Ct at 2461.
25. Id, quoting O'Brien, 391 US at 376, 377.
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thereby satisfying the first prong of the test.2 6 The Court also
found that the second prong of thd test was met because the stat-
ute furthered a substantial governmental interest in protecting or-
der and morality.2 7 Justice Rehnquist noted that a state's police
power traditionally included the authority to provide for public
health, safety, and morals, and that such bases for legislation have
been upheld.28
The Court next turned to the issue of whether the government's
interest in protecting the public morality was unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression.29 Justice Rehnquist determined that
the government's interest was not related to the suppression of
free expression in that the statute sought to prevent public nudity,
not the expressive activity of dancing.30
Finally, Justice Rehnquist noted that the restriction that the
dancers wear G-strings and pasties was no greater than necessary
to further the governmental interest in prohibiting nudity in pub-
lic places, and was therefore only an incidental limitation that was
justified.3" Thus the Court held that although totally nude dancing
was expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First
Amendment,32 the enforcement of the Indiana public indecency
statute did not violate the respondents' right to freedom of
expression.
33
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, argued that because the
statute in question was a general law34 not specifically directed at
26. Barnes, 111 S Ct at 2461.
27. Id at 2461-62.
28. Id at 2462. The Court here noted that public indecency statutes existed in forty-
seven states at that time, and that the current Indiana statute was the latest in a long line
of statutes barring all public nudity in the state which could be traced back at least as far as
1831. Id at 2461.
29. Id at 2462.
30. Id at 2463. The Court rejected the respondent's argument that the prohibition of
nude dancing was related to suppression of free expression because the state sought to pre-
vent the erotic message of the dance. Id. The Court reasoned that it was the non-communi-
cative aspect of the dance, i.e., the nudity, that the state sought to address, not the erotic
expression conveyed in the dance. Id. The Court concluded that a requirement that the
dancers wear G-strings and pasties did not deprive the dance of its erotic message. Id at
2462, 2463.
31. Id at 2463.
32. Id at 2460.
33. Id at 2463.
34. Id at 2464-65. To Justice Scalia, a general law is one which regulates conduct and
is not directed at expression in particular. Id at 2464. He noted that public indecency, in
addition to being a statutory crime in Indiana at least as far back as 1831, was also a crime
at common law. Id. Thus, public indecency predated the appearance of barroom dancing by
many years. Id. To lend further credence to his position that the statute regulated conduct
1992
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nude dancing, it did not require First Amendment scrutiny." Jus-
tice Scalia noted that not every law which restricts conduct is enti-
tled to such scrutiny, and that where the suppression of communi-
cative conduct is a mere incidental effect of forbidding conduct for
other reasons, the regulation will be upheld.a
Justice Scalia concluded that, because the state was regulating
conduct (nudity) rather than expression (dancing), the statute re-
quired only a rational basis to be upheld, and the moral opposition
to public nudity supplied such a basis for its prohibition.3 7
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Souter agreed that
nude dancing is subject to some form of First Amendment protec-
tion .3  He also agreed that the O'Brien four-prong test was the ap-
propriate analysis to determine the level of that protection. 9 How-
ever, he argued that the government had a more substantial
interest in prohibiting nude dancing than the protection of order
and morality advanced by the plurality.40 Justice Souter believed
that the governmental interest in preventing the secondary effects
of adult entertainment establishments, such as prostitution, sexual
assault and other criminal activity, was sufficient to satisfy the sec-
ond prong of the O'Brien test and thus to justify the enforcement
of the statute against nude dancing for entertainment.4 The pre-
in general and not expression in particular, Justice Scalia contended that it is possible to
violate the statute without conveying any erotic message, and that it is also possible to
express eroticism without violating the statute. Id.
35. Id at 2465. Under strict First Amendment scrutiny, any governmental regulation
prohibiting expressive conduct "precisely because of its communicative attributes" is uncon-
stitutional. Id at 2466. Justice Scalia likewise disagreed with the plurality's application of
"an intermediate level of First Amendment scrutiny" under the O'Brien test, whereby the
governmental interest must be important or substantial. Id at 2467. He argued that the
Court should avoid an assessment of the importance of government interests, particularly in
the area of morality. Id.
36. Id at 2466. In support of his position that a general law only incidentally affecting
a protected activity should be upheld, Justice Scalia cited Employment Div., Or. Dep't of
Human Resources v Smith, 110 S Ct 1595 (1990). Therein the Court held that a general law
prohibiting the use of the drug peyote did not require heightened First Amendment scrutiny
although the incidental effect of the law was to diminish the ability of those who used pe-
yote for sacramental purposes to practice their religion. Smith, 110 S Ct at 1603. Justice
Scalia thus concluded that if the general law is not directed against the protected value
itself, whether the value be religion or expression, the law should be upheld without impli-
cating the First Amendment. Barnes, 111 S Ct at 2467.
37. Barnes, 111 S Ct at 2468.
38. Id. Justice Souter argued that the "stimulative and attractive value" of nudity
when combined with expressive activity served to enhance the force of the expression. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id at 2469. Here, Justice Souter noted that South Bend did not have to "await
localized proof' of the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments to legislate
414
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vention of these secondary effects, according to Justice Souter, was
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and thus the third
requirement of the O'Brien test was satisfied.42 Justice Souter
agreed with the majority that the requirement that dancers wear
pasties and G-strings was no greater than necessary to further the
government's interest.43 He thus concluded that the statute was
not unconstitutional as applied."
In the dissenting opinion,45 Justice White began his analysis by
addressing the issue of whether nonobscene nude dancing is ex-
pressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.46 Although he
agreed that such conduct is a form of expressive activity, he argued
that the third prong of the O'Brien test, that the governmental
interest be unrelated to the suppression of free expression, was not
met.
47
Justice White argued that the Court was wrong in concluding
that the statute in question was a "general" proscription on indi-
vidual conduct.4s Rather, the purpose of the proscription in the
nude dancing context was to protect viewers from what the state
believed was the harmful message communicated by nude danc-
ing.49 Thus the third prong of the O'Brien test was not met be-
cause the governmental interest was directly related to the sup-
against them. Id. He cited Renton v Playtime Theatre, Inc., 475 US 41 (1986), in which the
Court upheld a city of Renton zoning ordinance designed to prevent the secondary effects of
adult entertainment establishments. Renton, 475 US at 44. The Court held that the city of
Renton was not required to justify the ordinance based on problems that would occur in
that city, but could rely on the experiences of other cities as a justification. Id at 50.
42. Barnes, 111 S Ct at 2470-71.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Justice White wrote the dissent, which was joined by Justices Marshall, Black-
mun and Stevens. Id at 2471.
46. Id.
47. Id at 2473-74.
48. Id at 2472. Justice White argued that the cases relied upon by the Court involved
nothing less than general proscriptions on activity. Id. Thus in O'Brien, the burning of draft
cards was prohibited anywhere, even in the home. Id. The law in question here, however,
did not involve a general prohibition on nudity because the statute cannot be applied to
nudity anywhere, but only to nudity in public places. Id.
Justice White further noted that under Baysinger, see note 5, nudity involving the com-
munication of ideas, such as in plays, operas, or ballets, was not prohibited by the statute.
Id. Thus, because the statute was not general in effect, the burden is on the state to justify
the restrictions. Id.
49. Id at 2473. Justice White contended that the purpose of prohibiting nudity in
public places such as beaches or parks is to protect others from the offensive conduct,
whereas that purpose is inapplicable to situations such as the one at issue in that all viewers
in adult entertainment establishments are consenting adults. Id.
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pression of the expressive activity of nude dancing. °
Finally, Justice White contended that the restrictions could only
be upheld if narrowly drawn,5' which these restrictions were not
because they banned an entire category of expressive activity.2 He
concluded that the Indiana public indecency statute as applied to
nonobscene nude dancing for entertainment was unconstitutional
as a violation of the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
expression."
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution guaran-
tees the freedom of speech from congressional infringement.5 4 Ad-
ditionally, through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the right to free speech is protected from abridgment
by the states.5 The First Amendment also guarantees the right of
citizens to engage in many other types of expressive activity in ad-
dition to the written and spoken word.5 6 One protected type of ex-
pressive activity is entertainment, which includes motion pictures,
programs on radio and television, and live entertainment .5  A ca-
50. Id at 2474. Justice White argued that, "The nudity itself is an expressive compo-
nent of the dance, not merely incidental 'conduct.'" Id.
51. Id, citing United States v Grace, 461 US 171 (1983).
52. Barnes, 111 S Ct at 2475. Justice White suggested a number of restrictions a state
could adopt without interfering with the expressiveness of nonobscene nude dancing, such
as requiring the performers to remain a certain distance from the spectators, that the activ-
ity be limited to certain hours, or that the establishments be dispersed throughout the city.
Id.
53. Id.
54. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. .. " US Const,
Amend I.
55. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in perti-
nent part: "No State shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." US Const, Amend XIV.
In 1925, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment was binding on the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652 (1925). US Const,
Amend 14.
56. Lisa Malmer, Nude Dancing and the First Amendment, 59 U Cin L Rev 1275,
1276 (1991). In note seven of Nude Dancing, the author cited a number of cases in which
certain activities were recognized as expressive conduct entitled to First Amendment
protection:
See, e.g., Texas v Johnson, US , 109 S Ct 2533 (1989) (burning American flag to
convey political message is protected expression); Spence v Washington, 418 US 405,
410 (1974) (per curiam) (attaching peace symbols to American flag and flying it up-
side down recognized as method of conveying political message); Tinker v Des Moines
School Dist., 395 US 503, 505-06 (1969) (wearing armbands to protest Vietnam War
was form of protected symbolic speech).
Malmer, 59 U Cin L Rev at 1276 (cited within this note).
57. Schad v Borough of Mt Ephriam, 452 US 61, 65 (1981), citing Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. o Wilson, 343 US 495, 497 (1952) (expression by means of motion pictures was included
416
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veat to the freedom of expression is that obscene material receives
no First Amendment protection.5
In the 1950's, United States courts first began to address the is-
sue of whether nonobscene nude dancing was a form of expressive
activity protected by the First Amendment. The earliest of these
cases was Adams Newark Theatre, Co v City of Newark.
59
Therein, two operators of a theater that provided live stage shows
featuring nude and semi-nude dancers brought suit alleging that
the statutory amendments to two city ordinances 0 were unconsti-
tutional infringements on freedom of speech.6 Noting that recent
decisions had placed stage shows and movies within the protection
of the First Amendment, 62 the New Jersey Supreme Court63 ad-
dressed the issue of whether the Newark ordinance was a permissi-
ble police power limitation on the freedom of speech. 4
Upon review, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the "domi-
nant effect" test.6 5 This test dictated that a court should look at a
within free speech guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Schact v United
States, 398 US 58, 62 (1970) ("street skit" was theatrical production protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments); Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v Conrad, 420 US 546, 557
(1975) (theatre and live drama were protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments);
Erznoznik v City of Jacksonville, 422 US 205, 206 (1975) (drive-in movies were protected
form of expression).
58. Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 485 (1957). For a discussion of Roth and the
modern concept of obscenity, see note 74.
59. 22 NJ 472, 126 A2d 340 (1956), afi'd, 354 US 931 (1957).
60. Adams Newark Theatre, Co., 126 A2d at 341. The two original ordinances (one
an ordinance regulating shows and exhibitions, the other a Disorderly Persons ordinance) in
general language condemned obscenity and lewdness by actors or shows. Id. The amend-
ments placed specific types of conduct within the general prohibitions of the original stat-
ute. Id. Among the activities prohibited by the amendments were "the removal by a female
performer . . . of her clothing, so as to make nude, or give the illusion of nudeness" and
"the performance of any dance . . . the purpose of which is to direct the attention of the
spectator to the breasts, buttocks, or genital organs of the performer." Id at 341-42. The
amendments punished the performer as well as the promoter of the show which violated the
amendments. Id at 342.
61. Id at 341.
62. Id. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v Wilson, 343 US 495 (1952); Adams Theatre Co. v
Keenan, 12 NJ 267, 96 A2d 519 (1953).
63. The New Jersey Superior Court had entered summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs. Adams Newark Theatre Co. v City of Newark, 39 NJ Super 111, 120 A2d 496
(1956). Adams Newark Theatre, 126 A2d at 343.
64. Adams Newark Theatre, 126 A2d at 342.
65. Id. The "dominant effect" test was first set forth in United States v One Book
Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F2d 705 (2d Cir 1934), aff'g 5 F Supp 182 (S D NY 1933). Therein,
the United States attempted to prevent the importation of James Joyce's novel Ulysses,
which was considered obscene. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F2d at 706. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that where a literary publication is sincere and the erotic
matter is not introduced to promote lust and does not furnish the dominant note of the
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performance with a sexual theme as a whole and determine
whether the "dominant note" of the dance is "erotic allurement.
6 6
If so, the conduct is considered obscene or indecent and is thus not
entitled to any constitutional protection. In applying the test, the
court noted that the majority of the acts prohibited, including
nude dancing, were acts condemnable as being contrary to "good
morals and decency."6 The court concluded that, because the
amendments in question were designed to contribute to the health,
welfare and morals of society, they were a valid exercise of the po-
lice power and were therefore constitutional. 9
In California v LaRue,7 0 the United States Supreme Court for
the first time intimated that nude dancing might be entitled to
some form of First Amendment protection under certain circum-
stances.71 LaRue involved certain regulations promulgated by the
California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (hereinafter
"The Department") prohibiting explicit live entertainment and
films in establishments licensed to serve liquor.7 1 Prior to the issu-
ance of the regulations, the Department held hearings concerning
disturbing incidents that had occurred at establishments that fea-
tured "topless" and "bottomless" dancing.7 3 The district court
ruled that the regulations unconstitutionally abridged freedom of
expression. 4  The Supreme Court reversed.75 Justice Rehnquist,
publication," the work is not obscene. Id at 707. The court held that Ulysses was not ob-
scene under this "dominant effect" test. Id at 707-08.
66. Adams Newark Theatre, 126 A2d at 342. The term "erotic.allurement" has been
defined as "'tending to excite lustful and lecherous desires', dirt for dirt's sake only, smut
and inartistic filth, with no evident purpose but to 'counsel or invite to vice or voluptuous-
ness.'" Id, quoting People v Wendling, 258 NY 451, 180 NE 169 (1932).
67. Adams Newark Theatre, 126 A2d at 342. See Bonserk Theatre Corp. v Moss, 34
NYS2d 541 (1942).
68. Adams Newark Theatre, 126 A2d at 343. The court did not specify who deter-
mines what "good morals" are, but stated that "[lit must be admitted beyond the realm of
debate that the large majority of the acts prohibited are obviously condemnable. .. " Id.
69. Id at 345.
70. 409 US 109 (1972).
71. LaRue, 409 US at 118.
72. Id at 110.
73. Id at 111. These incidents included: "Customers engaging in oral copulation with
women entertainers. . . public masturbation. . . numerous other forms of contact between
the mouths of male customers and the vaginal areas of female performers." Id.
The Department also found that prostitution, indecent exposure, rape and assaults all
took place in and around such establishments. Id.
74. Id at 113. The district court ruled that the regulations had to be justified as ei-
ther a-prohibition of obscenity under the Roth v United States, 354 US 476 (1957), line of
cases, or as a regulation of "conduct" with a communicative element, as in O'Brien v United
States (see note 23). Roth was the landmark case regarding the general law of obscenity in
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writing for the Court, noted that the states have broad power to
regulate establishments serving liquor under the Twenty-First
Amendment.76 The Court concluded that the Department made a
rational decision that certain sexual performances should not occur
on premises that serve alcoholic beverages." The Court indicated,
however, that not all such conduct was outside the protection of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments."8
In Doran v Salem Inn, Inc.,79 the Supreme Court moved closer
to recognizing First Amendment protection for nude dancing.80 In
the United States. Nude Entertainment as Public Offense, 49 ALR3d 1084 (1973). Roth held
that obscenity was not protected speech under the First Amendment. Roth, 354 US at 485.
The Court held that the proper test for determining obscenity was "whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests." Id at 489.
The Roth test was further delineated in Memoirs v Massachusetts, 383 US 413 (1966),
wherein the Court held that in order to find obscenity, it is necessary to establish that: (1)
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex,
(2) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards
relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (3) the material is with-
out redeeming social value. Memoirs, 383 US at 418. This test was modified in Miller v
California, 413 US 15, 23 (1973). Maimer, 59 U Cin L Rev at 1276, 1277 (cited in note 56).
The Miller test held that a party charging obscenity must establish that the material: (1)
would be found as a whole, by the average person applying contemporary community stan-
dards, to appeal to the prurient interest; (2) depicted or described in a patently offensive
way sexual conduct as specifically defined by the relevant state law; and (3) as a whole
lacked serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Miller, 413 US at 24. Malmer, 59
U Cin L Rev at 1276, 1277 (cited in note 56).
For a more thorough discussion of the modern concept of obscenity, see Obscenity, 5 ALR
3d 1158 (1966).
For a discussion of O'Brien, see note 23 and accompanying text.
75. LaRue, 409 US at 119.
76. Id at 114. The Twenty-First Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides in pertinent part: "The transportation or importation into any State. . . for delivery
or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
US Const, Amend XXI, § 2.
The Court, citing Hostetter v Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 US 324 (1964), noted that the
state's authority under the Twenty-First Amendment is greater than the normal police
power over public health, welfare and morals. LaRue, 409 US at 114. For a more thorough
discussion of state regulation of nude dancing at establishments serving liquor under the
Twenty-First Anendment, see Malmer, 59 U Cin L Rev at 1281 (cited in note 56).
77. LaRue, 409 US at 118.
78. Id. Justice Rehnquist wrote: "While we agree that at least some of these perform-
ances... are within the limits of the constitutional protection of freedom of expression, the
critical fact is that California has . . . merely proscribed such performances in establish-
ments that it licenses to sell liquor." Id. While not specifying what types of conduct would
be protected, Justice Rehnquist did state that the "sort of bacchanalian revelries that the
Department sought to regulate" were not the "constitutional equivalents of a performance
by a scantily clad ballet troupe." Id.
79. 422 US 922 (1975).
80. Doran, 422 US at 932.
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Doran, three corporations which operated bars providing topless
dancing as entertainment challenged as a violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments a North Hempstead, New York, city or-
dinance"' prohibiting topless entertainers, waitresses and bar-
maids.2' The district court granted a preliminary injunction to en-
join enforcement of the ordinance. 8 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed.8 4 The United States Supreme Court, cit-
ing LaRue, indicated that customary "barroom" nude dancing may
be entitled to a bare minimum of protection under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 5 Agreeing with the district court, the
Supreme Court observed that the statute applied not merely to
places which serve liquor,8" but to any "public place" where fe-
males appear with uncovered breasts.8 7 The Court concluded that
the district court was correct in granting a preliminary
injunction. 8
81. Id at 924. The ordinance in question made it unlawful for females to uncover
their breasts "in any public place." Id at 933.
82. Id at 924. The plaintiffs argued that the statute was overbroad because it prohib-
ited nonobscene conduct in the form of topless dancing. Id at 925. The overbreadth doctrine
dictates that a government may not enact regulations that reach both protected and unpro-
tected First Amendment activities. Malmer, 59 U Cin L Rev at 1288 (cited in note 56).
Thus, regulations that are not narrowly drawn to prohibit only activities which are not pro-
tected under the First Amendment, but also prohibit some activities that are protected, will
be struck down under the overbreadth doctrine. Id.
83. Doran, 422 US at 925.
84. Id at 926. The court of appeals held that the issuance of the preliminary injunc-
tion was warranted due to the "deprivation of constitutional rights and the diminution in
business" resulting from the prohibitions in the ordinance. Id.
85. Id at 932. Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion in an 8-1 decision.
Justice Douglas filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id at 923,
924.
86. Id at 933. Although the plaintiffs in this action were all operators of bars, they
still had standing to bring an overbreadth action. Id. The Court said that a statute or ordi-
nance may be challenged on the basis of overbreadth "if it is so drawn as to sweep within its
ambit protected speech or expression of others not before the Court." Id. Thus, although
the ordinance in question may have been constitutional as applied to bar owners, the fact
that it was drawn so broadly as to include others not before the Court gave these plaintiffs a
right to challenge it. Id.
87. Id. Justice Rehnquist quoted, "There is no limit to the interpretation of the term
'any public place.' It could include the theater, town hall, opera house . . . or any place of
assembly, indoors or outdoors. Thus, this ordinance would prohibit. . . a number of...
works of unquestionable artistic and socially redeeming significance." Id, quoting Salem
Inn, Inc. v Frank, 364 F Supp 478 (1973), aff'd, 501 F2d 18 (2d Cir 1974).
88. Doran, 422 US at 934. The Court was careful to emphasize that they were merely
holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunc-
tion, and were not intimating a view as to the merits of the plaintiffs' contention. Id. It is
important to note here that the Supreme Court, while implying that nude dancing "may
involve" the "barest minimum of protection" and that it "might" be entitled to some First
420
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Following Doran, many jurisdictions held that state public inde-
cency statutes prohibiting nude dancing were unconstitutional un-
less they were related to the regulation of establishments serving
alcohol.8 9 However, other courts, such as the Indiana Supreme
Court in State v Baysinger,0 upheld public indecency statutes as
valid exercises of the police powers. 91
In Baysinger, dancers and owners of adult establishments offer-
ing nude dancing as entertainment challenged the Indiana public
indecency statute92 as an unconstitutional infringement on their
First Amendment rights.93 The Indiana Supreme Court was then
faced with the issue of whether the public indecency statute was
overbroad. 4
The plaintiffs contended that the statute was overbroad because
it prohibited certain types of protected expression, such as nude
dancing, in addition to other forms of non-protected public
nudity.95 The Baysinger majority, however, held that barroom
Amendment protection, was not making a determination on that issue. Id.
89. Jamaica Inn, Inc v Daley, 53 I1 App 3d 257, 368 NE2d 589, 594 (1977) (Chicago
ordinance prohibiting nudity in any public place is unconstitutionally overbroad); New York
Topless Bar and Dancers Ass'n v New York State Liquor Authority, 91 Mise 2d 780, 782,
398 NYS2d 637 (NY Sup Ct 1977) (state law prohibiting "topless" dancing in premises li-
censed to sell alcoholic beverages is not an unwarranted unconstitutional invasion of the
freedom of expression); People v Nixon, 88 Misc 2d 913, 390 NYS2d 518 (NY Sup Ct 1976)
(Yonkers law prohibiting the exposure of a female breast in any public place is unconstitu-
tionally overbroad).
90. 272 Ind 236, 397 NE2d 580 (1979).
91. Baysinger, 397 NE2d at 587. The statute at issue in Baysinger was Ind Code §
35-45-4-1, the same statute which was analyzed in Barnes. Id at 581. The Baysinger case
was a consolidation of three separate cases each dealing with the same issue of whether the
Indiana public indecency statute was overly broad. Id. In two of the cases, the lower court
ruled that the statute was indeed unconstitutional and enjoined the state from enforcing it.
Id. In the other, charges of indecent exposure pursuant to the statute were dismissed on the
basis of vagueness and/or overbreadth. Id.
92. For a discussion of Ind Code § 35-45-4-1, see note 3.
93. Baysinger, 397 NE2d at 583.
94. Id. In addition to the overbreadth issue, the statute was also challenged as being
unconstitutionally vague in that the term "public place" was undefined. Id at 582. The court
found no merit to this contention. Id at 583. The court quoted Peachy v Boswell, 240 Ind
604, 167 NE2d 48, 56-57 (1960): "We have concluded that the phrase 'in any place accessible
to the public' . . . means any place where the public is invited and are free to go upon
special or implied invitation-a place available to all or a certain segment of the public."
Baysinger, 397 NE2d at 583, quoting Peachy, 167 NE2d at 56-57.
95. Baysinger, 397 NE2d at 583. The plaintiffs in this case relied heavily on Doran,
422 US 922 (1975), discussed in notes 79-88 and accompanyipg text. Baysinger, 397 NE2d at
584. The state asserted that Doran merely involved an interlocutory appeal and therefore
the Court never reached the merits on the constitutional issue. Id. The State argued that
Doran merely indicated that some form of nude dancing "might be entitled to First and
Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances. . . ." Id (emphasis added).
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nude dancing was conduct, not speech, and thus was not entitled
to First Amendment protection. 6 In support of its holding, the
court highlighted other cases which distinguished between nudity
in films and plays, which is entitled to some sort of protection if
part of a larger form of expression, and the public nudity sought to
be prohibited by public indecency statutes.9 The court concluded
that public nudity in and of itself was conduct traditionally within
the police power of the state.9 8
The United States Supreme Court finally addressed the nude
dancing issue indirectly in Schad v Borough of Mount Ephraim.99
In Schad, operators of an adult bookstore that featured live nude
dancing were charged with violating a borough zoning ordinance
that restricted uses in a commercial zone. 100 The defendants were
convicted in the County Court. 1' The New Jersey Superior Court
96. Baysinger, 397 NE2d at 587. The court stated:
It is clear the activity involved . . . appearing nude or dancing in the nude . . . is
conduct. Appellees make no claim that there is any pure speech involved in their
appearances.. . . This is a claim for some kind of right to appear nude in public...
for money. This activity is conduct, not speech, and as such. . . does not rise to the
level of a First Amendment claim.
Id.
97. Id. The court quoted LaRue, 409 US at 117: "As the mode of expression moves
from the printed page to the commission of public acts that may themselves violate valid
penal statutes, the scope of permissible state regulations significantly increases." Baysinger,
397 NE2d at 585. The court also cited Erznoznik, 422 US at 211: "Scenes of nudity in a
movie, like pictures of nude persons in a book. . .[are] distinguishable from the kind of
public nudity traditionally subject to indecent exposure laws . Baysinger, 395 NE2d at
586.
98. Baysinger, 395 NE2d 587. Other jurisdictions also classified nude dancing as mere
conduct not entitled to First Amendment protection, most notably in Crownover v Musick,
9 Cal 3d 405, 509 P2d 497 (1973). Therein, the California Supreme Court determined that
an ordinance regulating nudity in premises serving food and alcoholic beverages was not a
prohibition of protected expression but was a mere proscription of nudity. Crownover, 509
P2d at 505. Crownover was later overruled in Morris v Municipal Court, 32 Cal 3d 553, 652
P2d 51 (1982).
99. 452 US 61 (1981).
100. Schad, 452 US at 63. As construed by the New Jersey courts, commercial live
entertainment of any kind, including nude dancing, was prohibited within the Borough of
Mount Ephriam. Id at 65. However, certain forms of non-commercial entertainment, such as
the singing of Christmas carols and the performance of high school plays to which no admis-
sion was charged, were permitted under the statute. Id at 66 n 5. Additionally, an exemption
to the ordinance was granted to three establishments within the Borough which offered live
music prior to the enactment of the ordinance. Id at 64 n 3.
101. Id at 64. The defendants were found guilty in the Municipal Court. Id. The
County Court heard the case de novo on the record made in the Municipal Court and again
found the defendants guilty. Id. The County Court held that the First Amendment guaran-
tee of freedom of expression was not involved because the case involved a zoning ordinance
prohibiting all live entertainment, not merely nude dancing. Id. The county court did recog-
nize, however, that "live nude dancing is protected by the First Amendment." Id.
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affirmed.102
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether a zoning ordinance which prohibited all live en-
tertainment, including nonobscene nude dancing, violated freedom
of expression guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.103 Justice White, writing for the majority, set forth the
standard of review applied in zoning cases: "When a zoning law
infringes upon a protected liberty, it must be narrowly drawn and
must further a sufficiently substantial government interest.' ' 0 4 Ap-
plying this standard, the Court held that Mount Ephriam did not
adequately justify the restriction on the protected activity. 105 Be-
cause the ban on all live entertainment in general was not narrowly
drawn and did not draw upon a sufficiently substantial interest,
the Court concluded that the zoning ordinance in question could
not be constitutionally applied. 10 6
More important than the holding in Schad was certain dicta
that strongly indicated that the Court would recognize nude danc-
ing as a form of protected activity under the First Amendment.'
0 7
102. Id at 65.
103. Id.
104. Id at 68.
105. Id at 72. Justice White wrote: "None of the justifications asserted . . . [were]
articulated to the state courts and none of them withstands scrutiny." Id. The Borough set
forth four justifications for prohibiting live entertainment. First, it contended that "permit-
ting live entertainment would conflict with its plan to create a commercial area that caters
only to the "immediate needs" of its residents. Id. The Court rejected this contention be-
cause the only service prohibited in the commercial area was live entertainment. Id at 73.
The Borough next asserted that live entertainment could be excluded to avoid the
problems normally associated with live entertainment, such as parking, trash, and police
protection; however, this argument was rejected for lack of evidence. Id.
The Court also rejected Mount Ephriam's contention that the prohibition was a reasona-
ble time, place, and manner restriction. Id at 74-75. The Court held that exclusion of live
entertainment was not reasonable because it prohibited certain activities protected under
the First Amendment. Id at 76.
Finally the Court rejected the argument that the live entertainment prohibited was avail-
able in close-by areas outside the borough because there was no evidence presented to sup-
port that contention. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id at 66. The Court stated:
"Nudity alone" does not place otherwise protected material outside the mantle of the
First Amendment. Jenkins v Georgia [418 US 153 (1974)] at 161; Southeastern Pro-
motions Ltd. v Conrad [420 US 546 (1975)]; Erznoznik v City of Jacksonville [422
US 205 (1975)] at 211-12, 213. Furthermore, as the state courts in this case recognize,
nude dancing is not without its First Amendment protection from official regulation.
Doran v Salem Inn, Inc. [422 US 922 (1975)]; Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v Con-
rad, supra; California v LaRue [409 US 109, 118 (1972)].
Schad, 452 US at 66 (emphasis added)
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The dicta was not supported by all members of the Court, how-
ever.108 Chief Justice Burger, in a dissenting opinion joined by Jus-
tice Rehnquist, questioned whether nude dancing was entitled to
any First Amendment protection. 10 9 Justice Burger forcefully ob-
jected to the notion that states were not free to regulate nude
dancing, even if such dancing was entitled to some form of First
Amendment protection. 110
Thus, although the opinions in LaRue, Doran, and Schad led to
the strong implication that nude dancing was entitled to some sort
of First Amendment protection, the issue of nude dancing was
never directly addressed until Barnes v Glen Theatre."'
Considering the intimations of earlier cases, the Supreme
Court's decision in Barnes, recognizing a limited amount of First
Amendment protection for nonobscene nude dancing, was some-
what predictable. However, the Court's conclusion that the Indiana
public indecency statute, which required the performers to wear G-
strings and pasties, was nevertheless constitutional, so limited the
activity that the Court stated was protected as to, in effect, com-
pletely prohibit that form of expression. The Court could have
avoided that inconsistency by simply adopting Justice Scalia's view
that the statute was constitutional as a regulation of conduct, not
expression, and thus did not require any First Amendment scru-
tiny. The Indiana public indecency statute in question was not
aimed at the expressive activity of erotic dancing, but more gener-
ally sought to prohibit the conduct of appearing nude in public."
2
Thus any restriction on the protected activity of erotic dancing
was merely incidental.
Even if erotic dancing is entitled to some form of First Amend-
ment protection, it does not necessarily follow that nonobscene
nude dancing is also entitled to such protection. The state has a
rational basis for prohibiting public nudity as a proper exercise of
its police power in safeguarding public health, welfare, and morals.
108. Id at 86.
109. Id. Justice Burger wrote: "Even assuming that the 'expression' manifested in the
nude dancing.., is somehow protected speech under the First Amendment the Borough of
Mount Ephriam is entitled to regulate it." Id at 86-87 (emphasis added).
110. Id at 88. Justice Burger stated: "To say that there is a First Amendment right to
impose every form of expression on every community. . . is sheer nonsense.. . . To invoke
the First Amendment to protect the activity involved in this case trivializes and demeans
that great Amendment." Id.
111. Jeffrey A. Been, Erhardt v State: Nude Dancing Stripped of Its First Amend-
ment Protection, 19 Ind L Rev 1, 8 (1986).
112. Barnes, 111 S Ct at 2464.
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The fact that a person is engaged in a form of expression protected
under the First Amendment does not mean that a person has the
right to perform the protected activity in public in the nude. A few
examples will serve to illustrate this point.
According to Texas v Johnson,11 the burning of the American
flag as a form of protest is protected as free expression under the
First Amendment. 114 Thus any law banning the burning of the flag
could be unconstitutional. If, however, a person decided to make a
statement by burning the flag in the nude, that person would be
subject to the penalties imposed by a public indecency statute.
This is necessarily so because the public indecency statute does
not regulate the expressive activity of burning the flag, but merely
prohibits generally the conduct involved in performing the activity
in the nude.
Similarly, in this case, a person is free to perform an erotic
dance, and will be protected in so doing under the First Amend-
ment. If, however, that person chooses to perform the expressive
activity while in the nude, that person is still subject to arrest for
violating a valid criminal statute aimed at preventing public
nudity. The criminal statute is valid because it is not aimed at
prohibiting the protected activity of erotic dancing.
One may argue that the nudity involved in erotic dancing, unlike
the nudity involved in nude flag burning, is a necessary part of the
expressive activity, and therefore the message to be conveyed
would be significantly diminished, if not eliminated, by requiring
the performers to wear G-strings and pasties. Thus the enforce-
ment of a public indecency statute in that situation would directly
infringe on a protected form of expression. However, even in the
context of erotic dance, the nudity is merely incidental to the mes-
sage to be conveyed.
The erotic message sought to be conveyed in adult establish-
ments is a direct result of the dance being performed, not the fact
that the dance is performed in the nude. The nudity itself is not
the source of the eroticism. Unquestionably, little or no erotic mes-
sage would be conveyed if the nude performers simply came onto
the stage and sat on a stool, or laid down on the floor and went to
sleep. Yet, they would still be subject to the penalties of the public
indecency statute. This is true because the erotic message and
eroticism emanate from the dance, not the nudity. Indeed the ar-




gument could be made that the dance performed in G-strings and
pasties actually heightens the erotic message, as something is left
for the imagination.
Thus, instead of resorting to First Amendment scrutiny and the
O'Brien test to uphold the Indiana public indecency statute, the
Court could have upheld it because it addressed the conduct in-
volved in appearing in the nude in public rather than the protected
expression of erotic dancing. Under such an analysis, a nude
dancer would be guilty just as a nude flag burner, or nude sun-
bather, or nude hot dog vendor would be. The Court could thus
have avoided the inconsistency inherent in an opinion that recog-
nized nude dancing as a protected activity but upheld a statute
that effectively stripped that activity of that protection by requir-
ing "nude" dancers to wear G-strings and pasties. Justice Scalia's
distinction between the conduct and the expression achieves the
same result.
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Vol. 30:409
